{"id":3918,"date":"2021-02-02T18:49:19","date_gmt":"2021-02-02T17:49:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sinoskop.de\/blog\/?p=3918"},"modified":"2024-01-21T13:11:09","modified_gmt":"2024-01-21T12:11:09","slug":"roots-of-chinas-social-credit-score-iii-gastbeitrag","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sinoskop.de\/blog\/roots-of-chinas-social-credit-score-iii-gastbeitrag\/","title":{"rendered":"#79 Roots of China\u2019s Social Credit Score (III) [Gastbeitrag]"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Internet has become the main battlefield for the public opinion struggle. Some comrades say that the Internet is the „largest variable“ that we face, and if we get it wrong, it will become \u201ca worry in our hearts and minds“.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Xi Jinping on the Internet, leaked speech from August 2013.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Inhalt<\/strong><\/p>\n

China’s Social Credit Score in the Xi Jinping era<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

China’s Social Credit Score: Fact vs Fiction<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

The National Financial Credit System<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Commercial Credit and Scoring<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Municipal Social Credit Systems<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Roots of China\u2019s Social Credit Score, Part III, by Zaya Chinbat<\/p>\n

The Xi Jinping era, (2013 \u2013 present)<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Xi Jinping\u2019s selection to the role of the general secretary in 2012 marked the first time in the preceding two-and-a-half decades that the general secretary of the CCP had not been hand-picked by Deng Xiaoping. Having become president of China in the spring of the following year he called for the promotion of \u201ctraditional\u201d Chinese culture and like his predecessor Hu, made multiple references to the \u201cgreat revival of the Chinese nation\u201d (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing, \u4e2d\u534e\u6c11\u65cf\u4f1f\u5927\u590d\u5174<\/span><\/span>), proclaiming that \u201cthe great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern history\u201d (Xinhua, 2012).<\/p>\n

Despite ideological continuity, Xi Jinping\u2019s presidency is characterized by significant departures in governance styles from his predecessors of the Deng Xiaoping era. Namely, the accumulation of institutional powers embodied in his position as general secretary of the party, president of the country (after the successful abolition of the two-term limit for presidency), lifelong chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, and numerous leading groups responsible for shaping policy. Under Xi, policies have been introduced to re-assert the party into everyday political and economic life, e.g. through the expansion of the state surveillance apparatus and the extension of the Social Credit Score (SCS).<\/p>\n

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Reflecting this amassing of power, Xi has been elevated to the status of the \u2018core\u2019 (hexin, \u6838\u5fc3<\/span><\/span>) of the political leadership in October 2016 at the Fifth Plenum of the 18th National Congress of the CCP. The enshrinement of the \u201cXi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era\u201d the following year at the 19th Party Congress granted \u201chis ideas the same status as those of Mao in the party constitution\u201d (Economy, 2018, p.24).<\/p>\n

Subsequently, a government produced phone application \u201cStudy the Great Nation\u201d (xuexi qiangguo, \u5b66\u4e60\u5f3a\u56fd<\/span><\/span>) was rolled out labelled as an education tool, to enable the study of Xi Jinping Thought. It quickly amassed over 100 million users, with the Huawei store reporting 300 million downloads, and Wadoujia (another online app store) reporting 195 million downloads at the time. The application maintains a \u201clevel of access that no [other] app[lication] would normally have over a user\u2019s device\u201d and maintains an \u201cextensive user data collection and transmission\u201d (Open Technology Fund, 2019).<\/p>\n

Measures to limit the role of the international community in China have also been implemented, such as the 2017 Law on Management of Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), which moved the control over NGO\u2019s from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security. By 2018, the number of foreign NGO\u2019s registered in China had fallen from over 7,000 to fewer than 541, as of 24th August 2020 (China File, China NGO Project, 2020). The most significant domestic economic initiative to emerge from Xi\u2019s government is \u201cMade in China 2025″, which consists of \u201clocalizing and indigenizing technologies and brands, substituting foreign technologies, and capturing global market share\u201d (Economy, 2018, p.119) in ten key sectors.<\/p>\n

\n

#28 Made in China 2025 (MIC25)<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n